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ABSTRACT
The main thrust of this paper is to examine the intellectual capital (IC) disclosure of 137 listed banks in Gulf Co-operation 
Council (GCC) nations using a content analysis approach. Instead of examining the effect of board characteristics in 
isolation from each other, this study extends previous research on the determinants of IC disclosure by considering board 
effectiveness score in relation to IC disclosure. Moreover, this study extends previous studies in board-IC disclosure 
relationship by investigating the hypothesized impact of information asymmetry in moderating this relationship. Our 
findings show that IC disclosure is positively associated with the effectiveness of board of directors. In addition, our 
study provides evidence that the level of information asymmetry in GCC bank moderates the relationship between 
board effectiveness and IC disclosure. The finding is important for policymakers as it confirms that the effectiveness 
of board of directors in protecting the investors depends on the level of information asymmetry.
Keywords: Board of Directors; information asymmetry; intellectual capital disclosure; banks; Gulf Co-Operation 
Council
ABSTRAK
Teras utama kertas ini adalah untuk mengkaji pendedahan modal intelek (IC) oleh 137 bank tersenarai di negara-
negara anggota Majlis Kerjasama Teluk (GCC) menggunakan pendekatan analisis kandungan. Daripada mengkaji 
kesan ciri-ciri lembaga secara berasingan, kajian ini sebalinya meneruskan penyelidikan sebelum ini mengenai 
penentu pendedahan IC dengan mempertimbangkan skor keberkesanan lembaga berhubung dengan pendedahan 
IC. Selain itu, kajian ini meneruskan kajian terdahulu mengenai hubungan lembaga pengarah-pendedahan IC 
dengan mengkaji kesan hipotesis terhadap maklumat asimetri dalam memoderasikan hubungan ini. Penemuan 
kami menunjukkan bahawa pendedahan IC mempunyai hubungan positif dengan keberkesanan lembaga pengarah. 
Di samping itu,kajian kami turut membekalkan bukti bahawa tahap maklumat asimetri bank di GCC moderasikan 
hubungan antara keberkesanan lembaga pengarah dengan pendedahan IC. Penemuan ini adalah penting bagi 
penggubal dasar kerana ia mengesahkan yang keberkesanan lembaga pengarah dalam melindungi pelabur adalah 
bergantung kepada tahap maklumat asimetri.
Kata kunci: Lembaga Pengarah; maklumat asimetri; pendedahan modal intelek; bank; Majlis Kerjasama Teluk
INTRODUCTION
Voluntary disclosure and board monitoring activities 
are both viewed by agency theorists as two effective 
mechanisms to reduce agency costs and ensure improved 
protection of the company’s investors (see Jensen & 
Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983). Young et al. 
(2008) argued that one of the ways to protect shareholders 
especially the minority shareholders in countries with 
weak legal protection is to have higher disclosure quality 
and transparency. Thus, voluntary disclosure is considered 
useful to enhance the protection of such outsiders because 
it provides a signal to the minority shareholders whether 
the firm is committed to the treatment of its shareholders, 
in a fair and equitable manner (Chobpichien, Haron & 
Ibrahim 2008). This paper focuses on a particular type 
of voluntary disclosure, which is intellectual capital 
(IC) disclosure since IC is a key driver of the company’s 
competitive advantage and disclosing it will allow 
the shareholders to better anticipate the company risk 
(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007). 
 Based on the economic theory framework, particularly 
agency theory and hegemony theory, we examine the 
relationship between IC disclosure and board characteristics 
among the listed banks in Gulf Co-Operation Council 
(GCC). IC disclosure is expected to mitigate opportunistic 
behavior and information asymmetry problem (Cerbioni 
& Parbonetti 2007). Therefore, voluntary disclosure of 
IC primarily works as one of governance mechanisms. In 
addition to the voluntary disclosure, the board of directors 
is an internal corporate governance mechanism that 
protects shareholders’ interest by monitoring management 
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behavior. The board generally makes decision on behalf 
of shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) also argued that 
the board of directors is needed to minimize agency cost, 
by aligning the interests of manager and shareholders, 
as well as enhancing the level of disclosure. Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti (2007) claimed that internal governance 
works complementarily to corporate disclosures, and 
the application of more governance mechanisms will 
assist the company to maintain its internal control. 
They claimed further that it will work as an “intensive 
monitoring package” to reduce opportunistic behaviors 
of management and information asymmetry. Managers 
should not withhold information for their own benefit, 
so the level of voluntary disclosure in company’s annual 
report is expected to increase. However, previous studies 
that have examined the relationship between board of 
director’s characteristics and voluntary disclosure of IC 
practice (e.g. Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Singh & Van 
der Zahn 2008; Li, Pike & Haniffa 2008) found somewhat 
mixed results. The reasons for the mixed results in these 
studies could be due to their examination of the effect 
of governance mechanisms in isolation from each other 
(Ward, Brown & Rodriguez 2009).
Ward et al. (2009) argued that previous studies 
considered each mechanism separately in addressing the 
agency problems by ignoring the idea that the effectiveness 
of a mechanism depends on other mechanisms. In 
addition, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argued that the 
results of the effectiveness of an individual mechanism 
might be misleading as the effectiveness of the individual 
mechanism could disappear if a number of mechanisms are 
combined. Based on the idea that the internal governance 
mechanisms and disclosures are complementary to 
each other, the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms may be achieved through various channels 
(Cai, Liu & Qian 2008) and the effectiveness of a 
particular mechanism may depend on the effectiveness 
of others (Rediker & Seth 1995).  Hence, we suggest the 
use of several board characteristics to measure the board 
effectiveness as a factor to increase the level of voluntary 
disclosure.
Having said the important of IC disclosure and that 
several boards characteristic are needed as effective 
governance mechanisms to monitor management behavior, 
this study finds it important to examine the effectiveness of 
board characteristics on the IC disclosure. Specifically, this 
study examines the relationship between score for board 
effectiveness and IC disclosure. However, it should be 
noted that the intensity of board of directors’ effectiveness 
in monitoring the conflict between the majority and 
minority of shareholders is much affected by information 
asymmetry (Boone et al. 2007; Linck, Netter & Yang 
2008). Thus, in the weak legal protection of minority 
interests’ environment, the board of directors’ monitoring 
is limited internally through information asymmetry 
directed by management. This argument supports the 
hegemony theory. Further, Chen and Nowland (2010) 
stated that information asymmetry makes the monitoring 
activities conducted by the board of directors less 
effective. Transparency in the annual reports could not be 
achieved by the intensity of board of directors’ monitoring 
in companies where an information asymmetry is high. 
Therefore, this study considers it essential to examine 
the moderation effect of information asymmetry on the 
relationship between effectiveness of board of directors 
on IC disclosure.
All GCC countries (the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State 
of Kuwait, the State of Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, the 
State of United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia) have a mature, efficient, stable, and profitable 
banking system. These countries share some common 
economic, cultural, and political similarities, which by far 
outweigh any differences they might have (Al-Muharrami, 
Matthews & Khabari 2006). In 2008, the GCC countries’ 
economy accounted for around 1.8 per cent of the world’s 
total GDP of about USD61 trillion (Al-Hassan, Oulidi & 
Khamis 2010). However, the empirical study in GCC 
countries is lacking. 
Specifically, the banking sector in GCC is selected 
for this study because in GCC countries, banking sector is 
one of the largest sectors and there are more bank stocks 
traded in GCC stock markets than stocks of any other 
industry. Banking sector continues to be well-capitalized 
across the board with capital adequacy ratios of above 
minimum standards and comfortable leverage ratios by 
international comparisons (Al-Hassan et al. 2010). The 
business nature of the banking sector is “intellectually” 
intensive and for this reason, voluntary disclosure of IC is 
helpful for shareholders and corporate board is expected 
to play important role to increase the level of IC disclosure 
(Li, Mangena & Pike 2012). In addition, by focusing on 
a single industry, it allows us to control the differential 
effects of regulation in making the analysis. It also gives 
us the opportunity to assess the influence of the board of 
directors’ effectiveness on the level of IC disclosure of 
GCC-listed banks more directly. The competition in the 
banking sector at GCC is high and the corporate governance 
in this sector is better than other sectors. Despite this, 
however, the information asymmetry is still high while the 
level of disclosure is low in the banking sector (Chahine 
2007). 
The present study is significant as it contributes to the 
empirical literature on the evidence of relationship between 
the effectiveness of board of directors and IC disclosure. 
The effectiveness of the board is examined as a bundle of 
mechanisms. The results show that IC disclosure is greater 
for banks with a high score of effectiveness of board of 
directors. Secondly, this study provides the evidence that 
the relationship between the score of effectiveness of board 
of directors and IC disclosure is moderated by the level 
of information asymmetry. This means that the ability 
of board in enforcing the management to disclose more 
information about IC is affected by level of information 
asymmetry.  
The remainder of the paper is structured in the 
following sequence. The next section is the literature 
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review on IC disclosure, board of directors’ effectiveness, 
and information asymmetry and then followed by 
hypotheses development. Section 3 presents research 
method and the findings are reported in Section 4. The 
last section of this paper summarizes its key findings, 
and after discussing some of its limitations, a number of 
further research topics are suggested.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL DISCLOSURE
The researchers and analysts have not reached unanimous 
agreement on the definition of IC disclosure and its 
components. However, one of the most widely accepted 
definitions of intellectual capital, which is supported by 
a number of prominent authors (Sveiby 1997; Brennan 
& Connell 2000; Sullivan 2000), is formed by three sub 
constructs: internal capital, external capital, and human 
capital. Internal capitals include patents, copyright, 
management philosophy, technology, and administrative 
systems. On the other hand, external capitals include 
customer capital comprising relationships with customers 
and suppliers, brand names, trademarks, and reputation. 
Next are human capitals which refer to employees’ 
competence such as skills, knowledge, qualification, 
experience.
Disclosing information about IC in the corporate 
annual report is not costless. Williams (2001) argued that 
voluntary disclosure of IC could affect the competitive 
advantage of company since it provides signal to 
competitors of possible value-creating opportunities. 
According to Vergauwen and Alem (2005), a firm may 
be at the competitive disadvantage when it discloses 
sensitive information to outside investors. However, from 
the literature review, it could be deduced that disclosure of 
IC has advantages for company, investors, and markets. For 
example, IC disclosure can help organizations to formulate 
their strategies, to diversify and expand decisions, and to 
use as a basis for compensations (Marr, Mouritsen & Bukh 
2003). The disclosure provides the information about the 
real value and future performance of a company. Hence, 
it is considered as relevant information for investors and 
users (Bukh et al. 2005). Furthermore, IC disclosure may 
be considered to resolve uncertainty about the firm which 
in turn leads to the increase in the stock price, reduction 
in volatility of stock prices and a decrease in capital cost 
(Kristandl & Bontis 2007). Recognizing these advantages 
of IC disclosure, several attempts have been made in 
reporting IC. From these attempts, several models have 
been produced to measure and report the IC. For example, 
Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan 
& Norton 1992), Sveiby’s Intangible Assets Monitor 
(Sveiby 1997), and Skandia’s Value Scheme (Edvinsson 
& Malone 1997) are among the most popular models used 
to construct reports on intellectual capital.
Reviewing of literature reveals that majority of 
studies used Sveiby’s (1997) framework that categorizes 
IC into three categories namely, internal structure, external 
structure, and employee competence. For example, 
modifying Sveiby (1997) framework of IC by renaming 
the categories of IC to internal capital, external capital, 
and human capital, Guthrie and Petty (2000) examined 
the level of IC disclosure in Australia. The IC reporting 
framework suggested by Guthrie and Petty (2000) has 
been followed by several authors in many countries such as 
Brennan (2001) in Ireland, Bozzolan, Favotto and Ricceri 
(2003) in Italy, Vandemaele, Vergauwen and Smits (2005) 
in Netherlands, Sweden and UK, Li et al. (2008) in UK, 
and Yi and Davey (2010) in China.
Prior research mainly reflects the experiences from 
developed and emerging markets which have different 
culture, socio-economic situation, and political norms 
from those predominant Arab countries, particularly the 
GCC countries. Consequently, empirical investigations 
or surveys that have been carried out in the GCC region 
have been limited. Furthermore, majority of previous 
studies have concentrated on investigating the relationship 
between corporate governance and the IC disclosure of 
non-financial companies. In spite of this, IC is considered 
one of the major determinants of competitive advantage 
in banking sectors (Ranjith 2007) while corporate 
governance is also important in the banking sectors more 
than any other sectors because of the effect of this sector 
on other sectors in the country (OECD 2009). Thus, this 
study extends the previous research on the determinants 
of IC disclosure by considering board effectiveness score 
in relation to IC disclosure. Moreover, this study extends 
the previous studies in board-IC disclosure relationship 
by investigating the hypothesized impact of information 
asymmetry in moderating this relationship.
EFFECTIVENESS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND IC 
DISCLOSURE
The board of directors is one of the important elements 
in internal corporate governance mechanisms. The board 
plays the key monitoring role in dealing with agency 
problems (Chobpichien et al. 2008; Singh & Van der 
Zahn 2008; Aktaruddin et al. 2009). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argued that by monitoring and controlling the 
management, the board of directors can reduce agency 
conflicts where managers may have their own preferences 
and always fail to act on behalf of the shareholders. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the board of directors plays 
an important role in protecting not only the shareholders’ 
interest but also other stakeholders’ interests against 
management’s self-interests. To this extent, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) suggested that the board of directors 
should provide solutions to solve the problems faced by 
modern companies.
Chobpichien et al. (2008) noted that independence, 
size, frequency of board meetings, and non-duality 
of the chief executive officer (CEO) are the important 
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factors that determine the effectiveness of board that 
forces management to disclose more information to 
outside parties. Singh and Van der Zahn (2008) and 
Ruth, Emma and Martı´nez (2011) pointed out that the 
enhancement of board of directors in terms of board 
size, board composition, and leadership structure could 
improve board effectiveness and its capacity to monitor the 
management to the extent of increasing the possibility of 
providing more information about IC to outside investors. 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) suggested that the board is 
effective in improving the IC disclosure when it is small 
in size, has independent chairman with majority of its 
members also been independent, has active members in 
audit, nomination, and compensation committee. These 
elements, if present, would enhance the monitoring role 
of board of directors. However, it has been suggested 
that the optimal combination of these mechanisms can be 
considered better to reduce the agency cost and to protect 
the interest of all shareholders because the effectiveness 
of corporate governance is achieved via different 
channels (Cai et al. 2008). According to Chobpichien et 
al. (2008) and Ward et al. (2009), it is important to look 
at corporate governance as a bundle of mechanisms to 
protect shareholder interests and not in isolation from 
each other because these governance mechanisms act in 
a complementary or substitutable fashion (Chobpichien et 
al. 2008). This is in addition to Hill (1999) who posited that 
it is desirable to have a system which consists of several 
checks and balances mechanisms, and none of them is 
accountable by itself to provide solution to all the problems 
faced by companies. Based on the above arguments, this 
study suggests that when the characters that enhance the 
effectiveness of board of directors increase, the level of IC 
disclosure also increases. Thus, the following hypothesis 
is proposed:
H1 There is a positive association between the effectiveness 
of the board of directors and IC disclosure.
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN MODERATING BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS AND IC DISCLOSURE RELATIONSHIP
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983), outside directors are perceived as tools 
to protect the shareholders’ interest through monitoring 
managerial opportunism and enhancing the level of 
disclosure that reduces agency risk (Bhojraj & Sengupta 
2003). However, McNulty, Roberts and Stiles (2002) 
argued that outside directors are always less informed 
regarding the company operations as compared to their 
executive colleagues due to their notable operating 
distance from management. Due to this reason, the 
outside directors are incapable of spending enough time 
with the executive colleagues and consequently suffer 
from information asymmetry by providing the outside 
directors with incomplete control (Mace 1971). Hill 
(1999) further expanded on the issue by stating that 
non-executive control is hampered through information 
asymmetry manipulated by management. This problem 
could escalate if the company is managed by large 
shareholders who have selfish agendas that are contrary 
to the outside shareholders’ agendas, which consequently 
disallow the executive to provide more information 
for the outside directors (Fan & Wong 2002). Thus, 
information asymmetry in the company hinders non-
executive members from gathering necessary information 
on management activities e.g., information needed by 
the non-executive members for performance evaluation. 
Therefore, OCED (2009) suggested to policy makers in 
GCC to allow outside directors to easily obtain information 
that they needed in order to make the board governance 
effective in protecting all shareholders.
From the discussion above, it can be observed 
that one of the reasons for the mixed results obtained 
by previous studies on the relationship between the 
effectiveness of board of directors and IC disclosure 
(Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Li et al. 2008; Taliyang & 
Jusop 2011; Ruth et al. 2011) is information asymmetry. 
It is an indicator of entrenchment of management 
such that the lower the information, the lower the 
entrenchment of management. This would allow non-
executives to participate in making decision and in 
controlling the management. With a high degree of 
information asymmetry, entrenchment of management 
will increase and the managers will play a significant 
role in the decision making while the non-executives 
would not be able to control managers because they do 
not have sufficient knowledge about the firm or the power 
delegated to them by shareholders is actually exercised 
by the management (Demb & Neubaeuer 1992). 
Based on hegemony theory, information asymmetry 
is one of the mechanisms for management control which 
influences the effectiveness of board of directors. This 
study proposes that, as the level of information asymmetry 
increases, the ability of board of directors to enforce the 
management on IC disclosure decreases. Therefore, in 
line with hegemony theory, the following hypothesis is 
proposed:
H2 The level of information asymmetry negatively 
moderates the relationship between the level of board 
of directors’ effectiveness and IC disclosure. 
RESEARCH METHOD
This study used secondary data on all listed banks in GCC 
Stock Exchange. The listed banks were chosen for this 
study because of their greater commitment and exposure to 
investors in respect of mandatory and voluntary reporting 
than unlisted banks. The samples in this study have the 
following criteria: 
1. The banks published their annual report between 
2008 and 2010 in their website. 
2. The annual report was accessible and it contained 
complete information needed. 
JP(37) Bab 4.indd   36 7/16/2013   11:36:01 AM
37Board of Directors, Information Asymmetry, and Intellectual Capital Disclosure among Banks in Gulf Co-Operation Council 
Based on the above criteria, all Kuwaiti listed banks 
(11 banks) and several banks in other GCC countries are 
excluded from the sample. The final sample consists of 137 
out of 210 banks which are composed as follows: UAE (43), 
Bahrain (34), Saudi (28), Oman (16) and Qatar (16).  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: IC DISCLOSURE
Categories of IC captured were based on the index 
developed in a recent study by Zaman Khan and Ali 
(2010) (see Table 1). The reasons for adopting Zaman 
Khan and Ali’s framework are: First, they developed their 
framework based on Sveiby’s framework, which has later 
been modified by Guthrie and Petty (2000). Guthrie and 
Petty’s framework has been adopted and employed by 
other studies (e.g. Bozzolan et al. 2003; Vandemaele et al. 
2005) with varying degrees of similarity. Zaman Khan and 
Ali’s framework is more or less the same with Brennan 
(2001), April, Bosma and Deglon (2003), Abeyseker and 
Guthrie (2005), and Campbell and Abdul Rahman (2010). 
Second, Zaman Khan and Ali’s framework was applied 
on banking sectors. As a result, only those items that were 
consistently identified as relevant and were likely to be 
disclosed by banks were included. Zaman Khan and Ali 
have removed some items from Sveiby’s framework on 
the grounds that these would be better reported within 
the internal management reports of banks and that IC 
disclosure is a new phenomenon in the banking sector. 
To measure IC disclosure, this study employed content 
analysis, which has also been used in the previous studies 
on IC disclosure (Guthrie, Petty & Yongvanich 2004; 
Li et al. 2008). This is because content analysis allows 
repeatability and valid inferences from data according to 
the context (Krippendorf 1980). In order to increase the 
reliability of the scores, this study used the steps applied 
by Milne and Adler (1999), and Guthrie, Cuganesan and 
Ward (2008) as follows: First, the disclosure categories 
were adopted from well-grounded, relevant literature 
such as Zaman Khan and Ali (2010) who adapted their 
framework from well-grounded, relevant literature such 
as Sveiby (1997) and Guthrie and Petty (2000). Second, 
in order to increase the validity of content analysis, this 
study used the sentence as the measurement unit (Milne 
& Adler 1999). Third, the coder underwent a sufficient 
period of training, and pilot study was conducted in order 
to reach an acceptable level of the reliability of the coding 
decisions (Guthrie et al. 2008). 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
This study followed the direction of prior studies (e.g. 
Hanlon, Rajgopal & Shevlin 2003; Brown & Caylor 
2006; Chobpichien et al. 2008; Singh & Van der Zahn 
2008) and used a composite governance score to measure 
the effectiveness of board of directors. The score is 
a composite measure that sums the value of the five 
dichotomous characteristics of the board to create a bank-
specific summary measure of the effectiveness of board 
of directors. The higher score is an indicator of a higher 
effectiveness of the board of directors. 
The five binary characteristics that are included in this 
measurement are board independence, board committees, 
board size, board meeting and CEO duality. In order to be 
consistent with the prior studies, this study viewed board 
which is smaller in size, has more independent boards that 
held higher frequency of meetings, is not chaired by the 
CEO, and has at least three sub-committees as effective 
board. For each of the components (except for non-duality 
and number of board committees), this study calculated 
the sample median. The value of one was assigned for an 
effective characteristic (i.e., companies below the sample 
median for board size and above the sample median for 
percentage of independent directors and frequency of 
meetings). We then summed these values with the score 
of one for non-duality and also one for board with at least 
three committees.
MODERATING VARIABLE: INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
Information asymmetry is an indicator of entrenchment of 
management; lower information is lower entrenchment of 
management, which allows non-executives to participate 
in making decision and controlling management (Mace 
1971). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1988), the 
increase in the concentration of ownership leads to the 
increase in the entrenchment of management. This is 
because a major shareholder has sufficient voting power 
to appoint someone to be CEO, directors or chairman 
TABLE 1. IC Framework Adopted for the Study
Internal capital External capital  Human capital 
Patent Customers Training
Copyright Banks’ market share Employees’ educational
Corporate culture Business qualification
Management philosophy collaboration Work related Knowledge
Management and Franchising Licensing Work related
technological process Banks’ reputation for services Competencies
Information system  Bank name Know how
networking system  Entrepreneurial spirit   
Financial relations
Source: Zaman Khan and Ali (2010: 56) 
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(Shleifer & Vishny 1988). Management entrenchment 
gives members, who act as the controlling shareholders, 
the right to extract benefits from the firm at the cost of 
minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny 1988; Chrisman, 
Chua & Sharma 2005). For example, Attig et al. (2006) 
hypothesized that large wedge between controlling 
rights and cash flow rights can increase the likelihood 
of selfish behavior of those who are in control. The 
controlling shareholders can do so by reducing or delaying 
the information availability so that other shareholders 
cannot interfere. The withholding information can also 
make the monitoring conducted by the board of directors 
less effective (Filatotchev, Lien & Piesse 2005; Chen & 
Nowland 2010) due to the outside directors are always 
less informed regarding company operations.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argued that information 
asymmetry becomes severe when there are chances 
of extracting private benefit. So, when percentage of 
minority ownership in company increases, the chances 
for controlling shareholders to extract private benefits will 
decrease and thus the problem of information asymmetry 
will not be severe (Bruggen, Vergauwen & Dao 2009). In 
this case, the entrenchment of management will therefore 
decrease, thus the board of directors is able to control the 
management. This study used the percentage of minority 
ownership as proxy of information asymmetry. This means 
that the increase in the minority ownership in bank leads 
to the decrease information asymmetry and thus the board 
of directors is able to control the management. 
CONTROL VARIABLES
The study used bank size, profitability, and leverage 
that have been used widely as control variables in the 
empirical literature of corporate governance. Following 
Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010), this study measured 
firm leverage by dividing the total of liabilities by the 
total of assets and bank size was natural logarithm of 
total asset. Profitability was measured as the ratio of net 
income, before extraordinary items, to the total assets (Li 
et al. 2008).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The study used hierarchical regression analysis that 
has been commonly used as technique in identifying 
moderating effects (Baron & Kenny 1986; Frazier, Tix 
& Baron 2004). According to Aiken and West (1991), 
to detect moderator effects, interaction terms must be 
created. The interaction term is the product of multiplying 
the independent variable with the moderator variable. So, 
interaction term raises concerns about the multicollinearity 
problem between interaction terms and their component 
terms. To avoid this problem, the independent and 
moderator variables were standardized (Frazier et al. 
2004; Aguinis, Sturman & Pierce 2008). Standardizing 
(i.e., z scoring) also makes it easier to interpret the 
effects of the predictor and moderator in a meaningful 
interpretation (Frazier et al. 2004; Aguinis et al. 2008). 
After interaction terms have been created, everything 
is ready for conducting hierarchical multiple regression 
equation using SPSS to test for moderator effects. To do 
this, variables are entered into the regression equation 
through four steps. First step is to test the control variable, 
second step is to test the independent variable, the third 
step is to test the moderating variable, and the final step 
is to test the interaction terms of independent variable and 
moderating variable. The steps used were in accordance 
to the suggestion by Baron and Kenny (1986) and Frazier 
et al. (2004). The models are stated as follows:
Model 1: ICDi = α + β1BSIZEi + β2LEVi + β3ROAi + εi
Model 2: ICDi = α + β1BSIZEi + β2LEVi + β3ROAi + 
 β4EFFBODi + εi
Model 3: ICDi = α + β1BSIZEi + β2LEVi + β3ROAi + 
 β4EFFBODi + β5IAi + εi
Model 4: ICDi = α + β1BSIZEi + β2LEVi + β3ROAi + 
 β4EFFBODi + β5IAi + β6EFFBODi* IAi + εi
where: 
 α = intercept,
 ICD = intellectual capital disclosure, 
 BSIZE = natural logarithm of total assets, 
 LEV = leverage,
 ROA  = return on assets, 
 EFFBOD = score for effectiveness of board of directors, 
 IA  = information asymmetry, and
 ε = error term. 
EMPIRICAL RESULT
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
In Table 2, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of IC 
disclosure, in overall and categories. With regards to the 
overall of IC disclosure, Panel A in Table 2 shows that 
the average number of IC disclosure is 86.72 sentences. 
The maximum value is 175 sentences and the minimum 
value is 17 sentences. With respect to IC disclosure 
categories, the Panel A in Table 2 shows that the banks 
provided slightly greater number of information about 
internal capital at an average of 47.83 than both external 
capital and human capital disclosures, which scored 
31.72 and 14.37, respectively. This result is consistent 
with prior studies (e.g. Bozzolan et al. 2003; Brennan 
2001; Ali, Khan & Fatima 2008; Striukova, Unerman 
& Guthrie 2008). 
In Panel B of Table 2, the summary of the descriptive 
statistics for the independent, moderator, and control 
variables is presented. The panel shows that the average 
score of the effectiveness of board of directors is 2.53. 
Further information is presented in Table 3 to show 
the frequency for each score. As shown in Table 3, the 
majority of GCC banks have effectiveness of board of 
directors’ score of 2 (46 banks) and 3 (46 banks). Only 
five banks have the maximum score (i.e., 5) and only one 
bank has the minimum score (i.e., 0). Additionally, Table 
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2 shows that minority shareholding which is a proxy of 
information asymmetry on average is 38%. In terms of 
control variables, the Panel B in Table 2 shows that the 
log of total asset varies with a minimum value of 7.36 and 
a maximum value of 10.89. The samples had an average 
leverage level of 72% and a ROA of 2%. The negative sign 
in the ROA implies that some of the banks experienced a 
loss during the investigation period. 
TABLE 3. Frequency Board of Directors’ Effectiveness Score
 EFFBOD Frequency 
 0.00 1 
 1.00 22 
 2.00 46 
 3.00 46 
 4.00 17 
 5.00 5
Notes: EFFBOD is score of effectiveness of board of directors that is ranged 
from 0-5 (highest). Score is measured by given value of one for each effective 
characteristic (i.e., non-duality and board with at least three committees, below 
the sample median for board size and above the sample median for percentage of 
independent directors and frequency of meetings. The sample median for board 
size is 9, board independence 0.54 and 6 for board meeting. 
REGRESSION RESULTS
As shown in Step 1 (Model 1), Table 4, when the bank 
size, leverage and ROA are used as control variables into 
regression model, the coefficient of determination (R2) 
was found to be 0.23, indicating that 0.23 of the level of 
IC disclosure can be explained by these control variables. 
The result also shows that bank size and leverage have 
significant relationship with IC disclosure. However, ROA 
is not related with IC. This result is consistent with the 
results obtained by Li et al. (2008).
Table 4 also shows that by adding the score of 
effectiveness of board in Step 2 (Model 2), the R2 increases 
to 0.26. This change in R2 (0.03) is significant. This implies 
that the effectiveness of board of directors is positively 
associated with IC disclosure. This result supports agency 
theory and the arguments that as the level of effectiveness 
of board of directors increases, the level of IC disclosure 
increases (e.g. Cerbioni & Parbonetti 2007; Singh & Van 
der Zahn 2008). 
Table 4 also shows that by adding information 
asymmetry in Step 3 (Model 3), R2 is not significantly 
changed. According to the model, the information 
asymmetry is not significantly related to IC disclosure. 
This result indicates that there is no major effect from the 
information   asymmetry. This result is in line with the one 
obtained by Bruggen et al. (2009) where the information 
asymmetry was not significantly related to IC disclosure. 
To examine the influence of the information asymmetry 
on the score of effectiveness of board of directors -IC 
disclosure relationship, the interaction of information 
asymmetry with the score of effectiveness of board of 
directors was added in Step 4 (Model 4) in Table 4. 
As shown in the model, the interaction of information 
asymmetry with the score of effectiveness of board of 
directors is significantly related to IC disclosure. The 
R2 increases further from 0.26 to 0.31. This change in 
R2 (0.05) is significant. This indicates that information 
asymmetry moderates the relationship between the 
effectiveness of board of directors and IC disclosure. 
In more specific words, the results suggest that, as 
information asymmetry decreases (i.e. the percentage of 
minority shareholder increases in the bank), the positive 
relationship between the effectiveness of board of directors 
and IC disclosure increases.
Figure 1 also illustrates the moderating effect 
of information asymmetry (percentage of minority 
shareholder) on the relationship between the effectiveness 
of board of directors and IC disclosure. It appears from the 
figure that lower information asymmetry (higher minority 
shareholder) is associated with higher IC disclosure. When 
the level of the effectiveness of board of directors is low, 
the level of IC disclosure is low in banks with high and 
low information asymmetry. However, when the level of 
the effectiveness of board of directors is high, the level 
of IC disclosure is higher in banks with low information 
asymmetry (higher percentage of minority shareholder) 
than in banks with high information asymmetry 
(percentage of minority shareholder).
TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable  Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std. Deviation 
Panel  A
Overall  IC Disclosure 17.00 175.00 31 86.72 35.21 
Internal capital 10.00 140.00 45 47.83 24.76 
External capital  6.00 75.00 29 31.72 16.81 
Human capital   0.00 46.00 9 14.37 12.51 
Panel B
Effectiveness of board of directors  0.00 5.00 2.00 2.53 1.06 
Information asymmetry  0.02 0.85 0.37 0.38 0.20 
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.06 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Leverage 0.10 0.91 0.79 0.72 0.19 
Log of total asset 7.36 10.89 9.75 9.81 0.67
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Drawing on the argument that corporate governance 
should be examined as a bundle, this study suggests 
that the increase of the characters that enhance the 
effectiveness of board of directors leads to the increase 
in the level of voluntary disclosure. In addition, based 
on the arguments that the intensity of board of directors’ 
monitoring to reduce the conflicts between the majority 
and minority shareholders through the increase of the 
level of disclosure is affected by information asymmetry 
(Boone et al. 2007; Linck et al. 2008), this study suggests 
that information asymmetry moderates the relationship 
between the effectiveness of board of directors and IC 
disclosure.
There are several important findings revealed in 
this study. First, this study finds that as the level of the 
effectiveness of board of directors increases, the level of 
IC disclosure in banks’ annual reports increases. This result 
supports the agency theory and the idea that increase of 
the characters that enhance the effectiveness of board of 
directors leads to the increase in the level of voluntary 
disclosure.
Second, this study finds that information asymmetry 
moderates the relationship between the effectiveness of 
board of directors and IC disclosure. This result suggests 
that effective role that board of directors could play in 
enforcing management to disclose information about IC 
is affected by the level of information asymmetry. As 
the level of information asymmetry increases in bank, 
TABLE 4. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
LEV 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.36*** 
 (5.50) (5.10) (5.10 ) (4.54) 
BSIZE 0.16* 0.16* 0.16* 0.12 
 (1.98) (2.0) (2.0) (1.49) 
ROA 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01    
 (0.11) (0.28) (0.28) (0.13) 
EFFBOD  0.17** 0.17** 0.09    
  (2.20) (1.99) (1.04) 
IA   0.05 0.06   
   (0.06) (0.07) 
EFFBOD x IA    0.25**    
    (2.95) 
R2 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.31 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.28 
R2 change 0.23 0.03 0 0.05 
F change             12 4.8 0.04 8.7 
Sig. of F change             0 0.03 0.94 0
Notes: *, **, *** = p-value < .10, .05, .01, respectively, one-tailed. The coefficient estimates (numbers in parenthesis are t-statistic) from 
the regressions. Abbreviation IA = information asymmetry, LEV = leverage, BSIZE = board size, ROA = rteurns on assets, EFFBOD = 
effectiveness of board of directors, EFFBOD x IA = the interaction of the two variables.
















Effectiveness of board of directors
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board of director is unlikely to be effective. This finding 
supports homogeny theory which suggests that boards are 
weak and inefficient in monitoring management because 
of their reliance on management in obtaining information 
about the company`s operations. Thus, in situations under 
which information asymmetry problem is high, board will 
be less effective. 
The findings of the study are important for policy 
makers and investors as they confirm that the effectiveness 
of board of directors in enhancing the level of IC disclosure 
depends on the level of information asymmetry. Thus, 
policy makers should look for other mechanisms that 
motivate the management to enhance the IC disclosure 
in banks where the information asymmetry is a high. 
Findings of this study give investors sign that in situations 
under which information asymmetry is high, board of 
directors could not play effective role in enhancing IC 
disclosure. 
This study has a number of limitations that might 
warrant future research. This study can be considered 
as an exploratory and thus more works are needed in 
specific areas to improve it. As the samples used in this 
paper only involve the GCC-listed banks, in future, more 
samples could be included for a longer period of time. The 
test of the hypotheses could also be extended to different 
type of firms (i.e., in other sectors) or for the same type 
of firms but in different context (i.e., other Arab countries 
or Asia). Second, this study did not examine the effect 
of the legal enforcement on IC disclosure due to the low 
legal protection of investor rights and legal enforcement 
in all the GCC. Legal protection of investor rights would 
affect policies of voluntary disclosure on IC. Thus, future 
researches should retest these hypotheses in different legal 
protection setting. 
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